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4 The French Connection
A brief critical history
Ryan Gingeras
The man below, Joseph Fuca, was arrested in his home in the Bronx in January 
1962.1 Assembled behind him are a series of weapons as well as 11 kilograms of 
heroin. Fuca’s apprehension eventually led detectives from the New York Police 
Department to take Jacques Angelvin into custody. Officers seized Angelvin 
after secretly searching his late- model Buick, wherein they found 97 pounds of 
Image 4.1 Joseph Fuca, Bronx 1962.
Source: ‘Progress Report for the Month of November 1954’, 8 December 1954; District 17 Files; 
FBN Files, 1916–70; DEA Records; RG 170; NAB.
1 Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year Ended December 
31, 1962, Washington: US Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics, 1963.
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heroin. Fuca and Angelvin could not have come from more different walks of 
life. The former was a convicted burglar and brawler from Brooklyn; the latter 
was a television personality and nightclub owner from Paris. What brought these 
two men together was a vast network of traffickers, chemists, wholesalers and 
dealers in heroin. The story of the investigation that toppled them both, which 
became the basis of a popular book and Hollywood thriller, introduced many to 
what came to be called the French Connection.
 By the early 1970s, the ‘French Connection’ became a catch phrase for a 
complicated series of narcotic syndicates operating in cities and towns across the 
Middle East, Europe and Americas. Between 1945 and 1973, French Connection 
traders distributed untold amounts of heroin in much of the Western Hemi-
sphere, thus helping to foment a prolonged heroin pandemic. Proceeds from the 
network’s activities transformed the breadth and influence of organized criminal 
outfits across the North Atlantic and Mediterranean. From Beirut to Marseilles 
to New York, gangsters and associates with ties to the French Connection 
became individuals of significant political and economic weight. More impor-
tantly, the methods employed by chemists, smugglers and wholesalers involved 
in the network established new standards for drug traffickers worldwide. How 
the French Connection synthesized, shipped and distributed heroin arguably pro-
vided an essential framework for contemporary drug trafficking.
 It is commonly believed that a concerted diplomatic and investigative cam-
paign waged foremost by the United States led to the end of the French Connec-
tion. The outsized roles played by American agents in this investigation 
consequently nourished the expansion of American counter- narcotics activities 
around the world.2 Washington’s presumed victory over the French Connection, 
from the perspective of those who led the effort, represented a seminal early 
success in America’s War on Drugs. While the events and individuals related to 
the French Connection have now drifted into relative obscurity, how American 
law enforcement officials conceptualized and investigated men like Joseph Fuca 
and Jacques Angelvin continues to resonate in broader contemporary counter- 
narcotics policy and practice, including the continual focus on the drugs problem 
as originating from foreign actors.
 As critical as the French Connection is to the evolution of the modern drug 
trade, its history has yet to be thoroughly or critically documented. How Ameri-
can investigators and prosecutors publicly explained the French Connection’s 
origins and evolution still provides the spine for most modern accounts of the 
network. The object of this piece is to dissect the most consequential groups and 
aspects of the French Connection. By taking on the origins and evolution of the 
producers, traffickers and wholesalers linked to the French Connection, this 
effort entails more than just an attempt to separate fact from fiction. A close 
reading of the available sources related to the French Connection tells us much 
about the opportunities and pitfalls that beset any historical evaluation of the 
global narcotics trade in the modern era.
2 See P. Andreas and E. Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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The sources and their limits
The French Connection, both as a book and a film, gifted a name to the traders 
held responsible for much of the heroin imported into postwar America. But it 
was hardly the first account of the origins and significance of the trade. By the 
time Robin Moore3 published his gritty account of the events that led to the 
apprehension of Joseph Fuca and Jacques Angelvin, readers in the United States 
had already grown accustomed to articles and books detailing the growing threat 
posed by heroin and drug traffickers. Both investigative reporters, as well as 
active law enforcement officers, contributed to a wide range of features detailing 
the extent of the drug trade, often with great urgency. Alvin Moscow’s Mer-
chants of Heroin (1968) and Charles Wighton’s Dope International (1960) 
typify the tenor and conclusions of early American surveys of the trade.4 Both 
books take readers across the Atlantic and through major port towns straddling 
the Mediterranean, to depict heroin consumption in the United States as the 
product of a singular foreign conspiracy. The principal characters of both narrat-
ives – Corsicans, Sicilians, Turks and Lebanese – ply their work with an exclu-
sive eye for the American marketplace: ‘The international criminal conspiracy 
has but one aim, to provide adequate and regular supplies of heroin to the fantas-
tically rich market of New York and other great cities of North America.’ Amer-
ica’s own mafia, according to this thesis, was the central valve of the postwar 
heroin trade. It was through a ‘sinister alliance of Mafia and Jewish murderers, 
gunmen, millionaire gangsters and small- time dope- peddlers’ that heroin came 
to be transported and distributed in ever growing number of towns and neigh-
bourhoods across the United States.5
 Alvin Moscow and Charles Wighton were influenced by American law 
enforcement officials, who were among the most vocal, and at times the only, 
sources consulted in public renderings of the transatlantic heroin trade. The 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN)’s most renowned figures, men such as Harry 
Anslinger, Charles Siragusa and George H. White, acted as confidential sources 
to, and authors of, accounts detailing the surging nature of the heroin trade.6 
FBN officials had an even greater effect upon bureaucratic and public responses 
to the drug trade through the testimony and evidence they provided to congres-
sional committees. Reports issued by the Kefauver Committee and John 
McClellan’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations were each composed to 
the tune of the FBN’s understanding of the international narcotics trade.7 Both 
3 R. Moore, The French Connection, Guildford, CT: First Lyon, 2003.
4 A. Moscow, Merchants of Heroin, New York: Dial, 1968; C. Wighton, Dope International, 
London: Frederick Muller, 1960.
5 Wighton, Dope International, p. 251.
6 See H.J. Anslinger and W. Oursler, The Murderers: The Story of the Narcotics Gang, New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961; C. Siragusa and R. Wiedrich, Trail of the Poppy, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1966.
7 US Senate, The Kefauver Committee Report on Organized Crime, Washington, DC: US Congress, 
1951; US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotics, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964.
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committees are often accused of perpetuating the alien conspiracy theory.8 
Senator John L. McClellan’s findings still arguably constitute the most pro-
nounced and thorough public investigation of the men and methods most com-
monly associated with the French Connection. However, the FBN’s own internal 
correspondence make clear that the bureau’s participation in journalistic and 
official inquires did not serve the public good. Rather, FBN officials regularly 
inflated and misconstrued aspects of the heroin trade and epidemic in order to 
ensure the growth of the bureau.
 FBN efforts in shaping public impressions of the drug trade at times pos-
sessed foreign dimensions as well. In particular, the bureau’s chief administra-
tors were keen to use the press as a vehicle to lend encouragement or to chide 
collaborating agencies in Europe. In 1953, for example, Charles Siragusa, then a 
district chief working mostly in Europe, fed information on the Marseilles under-
world to one New York journalist in the hopes of pressuring lacklustre French 
policemen and judges into exacting stiffer penalties on local violators.9
 Diplomatic initiatives by President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s ushered 
in the greatest amount of public scrutiny of the French Connection. By the time 
William Fredkin’s film arrived in theatres, newspaper editors and state officials 
on both sides of the Atlantic openly grappled with Washington’s demands for 
greater French, Mexican and Turkish attention in matters related to heroin traf-
ficking. This new turn in American counter- narcotics policy produced the first 
contrary treatments of the heroin trade in Alfred McCoy’s The Politics of Heroin 
in Southeast Asia.10 Rather than treat the emergence of contemporary heroin traf-
ficking as solely the work of sinister gangs and networks based in Europe, 
McCoy’s research indicated that American officials, as well as foreign allies, 
were complicit in fostering and abetting the activities of foreign and domestic 
narcotics traders. Often lost in McCoy’s work was his contention that Asian sup-
pliers and traffickers, as opposed to Middle Eastern and European suppliers, 
were as responsible for the heroin epidemic gripping America.
 The New York daily Newsday provided a second, somewhat more subdued, 
critique of Washington heroin policy. The Heroin Trail comprised a series of 
investigative articles published by the paper detailing the fundamental flaws and 
failures of Nixon’s cooperative campaign to halt heroin trafficking across the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic.11 Newsday reporters documented a generalized 
pattern of deceit and misrepresentation when it came to French and Turkish 
counter- measures whilst providing evidence against Nixon’s premature declara-
tion of victory against the French Connection.
 New patterns in the international drug trade, as well as the supposed demise 
of the French Connection, eventually rendered such critiques moot. The rise of 
 8 D.C. Smith, The Mafia Mystique, New York: Basic Books, 1975.
 9 Charles Siragusa to Barrett McGurn, 3 March 1953; France Files, 1951–9; FBN Files, 1916–70; 
DEA Records; RG 170; NAB.
10 A. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, Chicago: Law-
rence Hill, 2003.
11 Newsday, The Heroin Trail, New York: New American Library, 1973.
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cocaine as a dominant commodity in the North American and European markets 
particularly helped to relegate the French Connection to the realm of historical 
study. As the French Connection faded into popular obscurity, journalists and 
scholars have tended to treat the network’s most noted traffickers and methods 
more inclusively or as symptomatic of broader patterns within the opiate trade. 
Several broad surveys of the heroin trade only make reference to the French 
Connection in passing.12 Most studies of mafia families in the United States 
touch upon the French Connection only tangentially.13 Journalist Jean- Pierre 
Charbonneau’s Canadian Connection stands as the most thorough assessment of 
the transatlantic heroin trade’s effect on the United States and Canada.14 Three 
regional academic studies of narcotics and organized crime in countries outside 
of North America offer far more discrete treatments of the French Connection as 
an essential component of the history of narcotics in Cuba, Lebanon and Tur-
key.15 Journalists in France have arguably contributed the most vital accounts of 
the French Connection. Since the publication of Jean Bazal’s premiere study of 
the Marseille underworld a number of French language works have offered 
readers a variety of insights into the roles played by French traffickers in the 
heyday of the transatlantic heroin trade.16 Jerome Pierrat’s detailed study stands 
as perhaps the most complete account of the personalities and events that con-
tributed to the trading and manufacturing networks that made the city a global 
hub for heroin traffickers.17
 Despite the relatively large number of works on organized crime in Marseille 
(and France in general), remarkably few French works contain references to 
archival sources or printed interviews. Even Pierrat’s work relies almost exclu-
sively on published material in retelling the story of the French Connection. 
Other books recently published in France rely heavily upon interviews (all 
uncited) with policemen and traffickers.18 The lack of original or verifiable 
12 M. Booth, Opium: A History, New York: St Martins, 1999; J. Jonnes, Hep-cats, Narcs and Pipe 
Dreams: A History of America’s Romance with Illegal Drugs, Baltimore: John Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1999; K. Meyer and T. Parssinen, Web of Smoke: Smugglers, Warlords, Spies and the 
History of the International Drug Trade, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998; J. Windle, 
Suppressing Illicit Opium Production: Successful Intervention in Asia and the Middle East, 
London: I.B. Tauris, 2016.
13 S. Fox, Power and Blood, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1989; S. Raab, Five Fam-
ilies: The Rise, Decline and Resurgence of America’s Most Powerful Mafia Empires, New York: 
St Martins Griffin, 2006.
14 J. Charbonneau, The Canadian Connection, Ottawa: Optimum Publishing, 1976.
15 R. Gingeras, Heroin, Organized Crime and the Making of Modern Turkey, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014; J. Marshall, The Lebanese Connection, Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2012; E.S. Rovner, The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking, Smuggling and Gamb-
ling in Cuba from the 1920s to the Revolution, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2008.
16 J. Bazal, Le Clan des Marseillais: Des Nervis aux Caïds, 1900–1974, Paris: Guy Authier, 1974.
17 J. Pierrat, Une Histoire du Milieu: Grand Banditisme et Haute Pègre en France de 1850 a Nos 
Jours, Paris: Denoël, 2003.
18 F. Missen, Marseille Connection, Montreal: L’Archipel, 2013; P. Pean, Compromissions: La 
Republique et la Mafia Corse, Paris: Fayard, 2015.
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historical sources is indicative of several general challenges and trends in this 
emerging field. Virtually none of the notorious characters who contributed to the 
making of the trade’s construction left first- hand accounts of their deeds. Some 
memoirs offer second- hand insights or indirect talk of the French Connection.19 
It is also likely that many of the recollections published by the trade’s insiders 
are flawed or false.20
 Government records remain the most widely used and reliable sources uti-
lized by contemporary scholars. To date, researchers have made varied use of 
the national archives of the United States, Cuba, Great Britain, France, Italy and 
Turkey in works related to the history of the French Connection. While some 
collections, such as holdings in Ottawa, London and Rome, appear relatively 
open and await further exploration, still others are beset by restrictions related to 
privacy and state secrecy. War and political instability, as well as official reti-
cence, has made research in Beirut and Damascus at times difficult or imposs-
ible. Files housed in Turkey’s Interior Ministry building, for example, remain 
largely off- limits to the public (although some of the ministry’s records can be 
seen in the Prime Minister’s Republican Archive in Ankara). The extent to 
which France’s Sûreté Nationale has declassified relevant papers or files from 
the postwar period is not entirely clear. Recent work published by Alexandre 
Marchant offers hopeful signs that the Center for Contemporary Archives in 
Fontainbleau suggests that a number of interesting findings await researchers.21
 By far and away the most indispensable source related to the French Connec-
tion has been the records found in the National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration (NARA) collection in Silver Springs, Maryland. Yet as in the case of 
most archives, the body of documentation found in NARA is neither complete 
nor without certain imperfections. For reasons that remain unexplained (and pos-
sibly in defiance of federal law), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
has delivered only a small fraction of its internal files from the period beyond the 
FBN’s termination in 1967. Those that have been delivered tend to be very short 
and taciturn accounts written by narcotics agents. Many documents are with-
drawn due to the presence of personal information (mostly from confidential wit-
nesses) as well as classified information deemed vital to national security.
 Apart from these issues related to document access and availability, con-
temporary historians and practitioners must reckon with the reality that the 
French Connection, as conceived by those who participated in or policed it, was 
in part a work of fiction. Crime, as a profession, does not lend itself to truth 
19 J. Bonanno with S. Lalli, Man of Honor: The Autobiography of Joseph Bonanno, New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1983; M. Gosch and R. Hammer, The Last Testament of Lucky Luciano, 
Boston: Little, Brown, 1975; M. Guerini, La Saga Guerini, Paris: Flammarion, 2003; M. Paole-
schi, Le Millieu et Moi, Paris: Fanval, 1987.
20 For discussion on the limitations of offender autobiographies as sources: J. Windle, ‘Tuckers 
Firm: A case study of British organised crime’, Trends in Organized Crime, 16(4), 2013, 
382–96.
21 A. Marchant, ‘The French Connection: Between Myth and Reality’, Vingteme Siecle. Revue d’ 
Histoire, 115, July–September 2012, 89–102.
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telling. For this reason alone, all those who witnessed the French Connection’s 
development, including policemen, had good reason to misunderstand or mis-
construe what they saw. Thus, what follows constitutes only an approximate 
survey of the individuals, events and trends that defined the French Connection.
The source: opium production and refinement in the 
Middle East
Transatlantic heroin trafficking after the Second World War could be more accu-
rately described as the result of a ‘French- Turkish Connection’. Thinking about 
the trade in this way, as analysts at the CIA proposed in 1971, allows for equal 
appreciation of the main producers and suppliers that were at the heart of inter-
national attention.22 In historical terms, Turkey’s path to becoming a hub of nar-
cotics trafficking began decades in advance of the French smugglers most 
credited with the postwar heroin trade. The history of Turkish opium production 
is fairly well documented, as is the diplomatic efforts by the US to push Turkey 
to control its farmers in a bid to limit its supply of opium to global heroin 
markets.23
 The outbreak of the Second World War, as well as events occurring immedi-
ately thereafter, helped to solidify Turkey’s eminent position with the postwar 
global heroin trade. As a neutral power, the Turkish Republic was among the 
few states capable and willing to sell needed morphine stocks to Europe’s 
warring factions. By contrast, devastation wrought by the conflict, as well as 
Tito’s crackdown on diversion of opium from licit trade, helped to cut the 
cultivation of opium in Yugoslavia dramatically.24 An even greater stimulant for 
Turkey’s further rise within the illicit heroin trade came as a result of Tehran’s 
decision to ban the cultivation and consumption of opium in 1955.25 Prohibition- 
inflated Iranian demand for opium undoubtedly complemented the pressures 
brought on by the growing rates of heroin use in Europe and the Americas.
22 Directorate of Intelligence, ‘The French-Turkish Connection: The Movement of Opium and Mor-
phine Base from Turkey to France (December 1971)’, CIA-RDP 73B00296R000300070022–8, 
CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), NARA.
23 A. Block, ‘European drug traffic and traffickers between the wars: The policy of suppression and 
its consequences’, Journal of Social History, 23(2), 1989, 315–37; Gingeras, Heroin; R. Matthee, 
The Pursuit of Pleasure: Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History 1500–1900, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005; İ.İ. Poroy, ‘Expansion of opium production in Turkey and the 
state monopoly of 1828–1839’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 13(2), 1981, 
191–211; A.Ü. Turgay, ‘The nineteenth century Golden Triangle: Chinese consumption, Ottoman 
production, and the American connection’, International Journal of Turkish Studies, 3(1), 
1984–5, 65–93; J. Windle, ‘A very gradual suppression: A history of Turkish opium controls, 
1933–1974’, European Journal of Criminology, 11(2), 2014, 195–212; Windle, Successful.
24 V. Kušvíé, ‘Cultivation of the opium poppy and opium production in Yugoslavia’, UNODC (1 
January 1960). Online. Available: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bul-
letin_1960-01-01_2_page003.html (accessed 16 January 2016).
25 R. Gingeras, ‘Poppy politics: American agents, Iranian addicts and Afghan opium, 1945–1980’, 
Iranian Studies, 45(3), 2012, 315–31; also Windle, Suppressing.
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 The internal mechanics of the opium/heroin trade in Turkey evolved sizably 
in the quarter century that followed the Second World War. While ministers in 
Ankara may have boasted a strong mandate over opium cultivation, diversion of 
opium to the black market remained significant. Farmers stockpiled excess 
opium and sold hidden shares to illicit merchants touring the provinces. Buyers 
of the contraband opium in the 1950s and 1960s often paid well above the state 
monopoly’s rate. While some buyers were freelancers (including merchants trav-
elling from as far away as Syria and Lebanon), representatives working for 
major Istanbul wholesalers of illegal opium, morphine and heroin often arranged 
sales with trusted agents in advance. Regardless of the purchaser, contraband 
was usually shipped abroad via one of two points of departure: Istanbul or the 
border province of Gaziantep.26
 A profound cultural shift among Istanbul’s major wholesalers accompanied 
the postwar surge in the illicit heroin trade. Since the dawn of the opiate revolu-
tion in the nineteenth century, non- Muslim merchants (particularly Orthodox 
Christians and Sephardic Jews) played outsized roles in the transnational sale of 
Anatolian opium. Ankara’s steady push to ‘nationalize’ the country’s economy 
in the first half of the twentieth century (a policy that expressly entailed the dilu-
tion of non- Muslim mercantile interests) eventually had an impact upon the 
makeup of Istanbul’s heroin underworld. By the early 1950s, most of the city’s 
prominent patrons (or opiate wholesalers) were Sunni Muslims. A number of 
these major players, men such as İhsan Sekban and Hüseyin Eminoğlu, were 
members of the city’s large diaspora from the region of Lazistan, located along 
Turkey’s north- eastern Black Sea coast. While it is not entirely clear what organ-
izational structure presided over the ‘Laz groups’ of Istanbul, it is likely that 
shared filial and regional ties (often referred to as hemşehrilik) helped to bind 
these networks together. It is also unclear what kind of rules governed the busi-
ness dealings of notable figures such as Sekban and Eminoğlu. Anecdotal 
accounts from journalists and FBN agents suggest that the negotiations that often 
took place in Istanbul over narcotics were largely informal and ad- hoc in Istan-
bul. The city’s underworld luminaries tended to deal in raw opium (although 
some figures such as Eminoğlu and Sekban did possess laboratories capable of 
producing morphine and heroin for transshipment). Until the late 1960s, Istanbul 
dealers often arranged for shipments to be delivered via processors and smug-
glers based in Syria and Lebanon (although some, such as Eminoğlu, did at times 
dispatch opiates directly to outfits based in France and Italy). Most surprisingly, 
no evidence has emerged of internal jockeying or competition among Istanbul’s 
major dealers; how Turkish networks interacted with one another remains a 
complete mystery.27
 Turkey’s other epicentre for opium trafficking, Gaziantep, functioned in close 
cooperation with a variety of networks based in Syria and Lebanon. Like the 
Istanbul underworld, narcotics were not the only commodities trafficked among 
26 Gingeras, Heroin.
27 Ibid.
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smugglers residing along Turkey’s southern border. The rigid state economies of 
Turkey and Syria incentivized opium brokers in Gaziantep, Aleppo and Istanbul 
to trade in various forms of contraband (such as nuts, cigarettes, coffee, tea and 
currency). American investigators similarly depicted the trans- Turkish/Syria net-
works in ethnic terms. Rank and file smugglers along the Turkish- Syrian frontier 
may have been largely Kurdish, although at least one noted southern trafficker, 
Ahmet Soysal, was an immigrant from the Balkans. At the height of the French 
Connection investigation, American sources contended that eight powerful fac-
tions dominated the flow of opiates through Turkey’s southern border (a col-
lective that worked either in cooperation or in competition with nine, 
predominately Laz, traffickers based in Istanbul).28
 Much of Turkey’s opium was processed into heroin in Lebanon and Syria. 
Cases promulgated by American agents offer only a partial account of narcotics 
production and trafficking in Syria and Lebanon. Until the mid- 1960s, foreign 
and domestic law enforcement officials were inclined to see Syria and Lebanon 
as an integral nexus in the transit and chemical conversion of morphine base and 
heroin. Like in Turkey, public reports and internal surveys issued by the FBN 
tended to accent the roles of supposed ‘gang leaders’ at the expense of their sub-
ordinates or lesser competing traffickers. Investigations led American officials to 
see the movement of drugs and people across the Lebanese/Syrian border as rel-
atively fluid. Authorities in the region regularly focused upon Aleppo as the 
most important centre of processing Turkish opium into morphine (although 
some chemists were suspected of operating small laboratories in Damascus and 
Beirut). Omar Makkouk, whose whole family was suspected of training chemists 
and operating laboratories for much of the 1950s and 1960s, frequently shifted 
across the Syrian/Lebanese frontier depending upon the political climate.29 At 
the height of the FBN’s investigation into the activities of Lebanese narcotics 
activities, American officials suspected that a hundred kilos of morphine base 
exited the port of Beirut every month.30 Traffic between Lebanon and France 
appeared to have been generally stable until the outbreak of the Six Day War. 
Major smuggling magnates, such as Sami al- Khoury, maintained regular per-
sonal contact with buyers in Marseille and elsewhere in Europe. While auto-
mobiles fitted with secret compartments served as the main vehicles for 
transporting opiates across the Lebanese/Syrian border, merchant marines, diplo-
mats and experienced smugglers comprised the main proxies tasked with ship-
ping morphine and heroin abroad.31
28 Ibid.
29 Arthur Doll to Washington, 19 January 1966; Lebanon Files, 1961–7; FBN Files, 1916–70; DEA 
Records; RG 170; NAB; US Senate 948–9.
30 John Cusack to Harry Anslinger, 27 June 1961; Lebanon Files, 1955–6; FBN Files, 1916–70; 
DEA Records; RG 170; NAB. At the time of this estimate, Lebanese officials were already sug-
gesting that the flow of opium and morphine out of Turkey was beginning to bypass Beirut in 
favour of direct shipments to France.
31 ‘Memorandum Report’, 29 April 1957; Syria Files, 1948–67; FBN Files, 1916–70; DEA 
Records; RG 170; NAB.
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 Washington’s public depiction of postwar heroin trafficking in Lebanon and 
Syria still leaves much to the imagination. Official and journalistic investigations 
into smuggling in Beirut, for example, do not offer definitive insights into how 
smuggling rings were organized or how labs were maintained or operated. With 
the exception of Sami al- Khoury, whose long career in the narcotics trade was 
made known to exposé writers like Charles Wighton and others, there is very 
little biographical information that exists on key figures associated with the 
Syrian and Lebanese opiate industries.32 Unlike other nodes of the French Con-
nection, FBN investigators made few sweeping assumptions regarding the ethnic 
or communal ties that bound traffickers within Levant. Al- Khoury and Antoine 
Harrouk, both Catholics from Zahle, traded and worked alongside presumed 
Shiites, like Munir Alakki (Mounir Alaquie), and Sunnis, like Omar Makkouk. 
FBN agents did however make note of prominent Armenians associated with 
Lebanese trafficking, such as Hagop Kevorkian and Antranik Paroutian (as well 
as, to some extent, Edourd Toudayan), who were seen as natural middlemen due 
to their multi- linguistic abilities and their personal familiarity with the Levant 
and France.33
 What American officials, as well as foreign journalists, were more reluctant 
to publically and privately admit to was the degree to which officials in Turkey, 
Syria and Lebanon abetted narcotics activity. FBN agents detailed to Beirut and 
Istanbul regularly lamented occasions when local police officials derailed inves-
tigations by leaking information to suspecting traffickers. More often than not, 
Turkish and Lebanese officials used (and in turn protected) active narcotic smug-
glers as confidential informants. The need to produce seizures and arrests also 
led American agents to tolerate acts of corruption, as well as de facto smuggling, 
among middle- and high- ranking officials. Farid Chehab, postwar head of Leba-
non’s Sûreté Nationale and the cousin of President Fuad Chehab, possessed a 
notorious reputation as an opiate and hashish trafficker. Officials at various 
levels of Lebanon’s government were suspected of shielding Sami al- Khoury 
from prosecution.34 Istanbul- based FBN agents were similarly suspicious of 
members of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’ government, namely Namık 
Gedik and Kemal Aygün, who were implicated in harbouring officials and traf-
fickers involved in the drug trade. It is difficult to ascertain how Turkish, Leba-
nese and Syrian officials perceived corruption and complicity in the regional 
heroin trade. Interior Ministry officials in Turkey, for their part, were only 
willing to see smuggling along the country’s southern and eastern border as the 
result of ‘some irregularities [found] in our economic and social structure’.35 The 
ministry’s analysis of these ‘irregularities’, such as unemployment, shortages 
and high prices, did not include the effect smuggling had upon the country’s 
governing institutions.
32 Wighton, Dope.
33 For comparative biographical information, see US Senate, Organized Crime.
34 Marshall, The Lebanese.
35 BCA 30.0.001.000.000.39.235.4, 21 August 1965.
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Across the Atlantic: heroin processing and distribution 
between France and the Western Hemisphere
Heroin trafficking across the Atlantic, for most American and French policemen, 
politicians and reformers, represented an intrinsically ethnic conspiracy. Corsi-
can and Italian immigrants comprised virtually all of the chief suspects respons-
ible for drug shipments across the ocean in the decades immediately following 
the Second World War. Bonds forged through a common culture, one seemingly 
derived from the endogamous norms shared between Corsica and the Mezzo-
giorno, seemingly helped forge an alliance between traffickers based largely in 
Marseille, New York, Montreal and Buenos Aires.36 Such a conclusion, for both 
contemporary and present- day critics, stemmed in part from popular insecurities 
that accompanied the development of these diaspora communities within these 
separate cities. Naturally, it need not be supposed that Italian, Corsican or other 
immigrants were somehow culturally predisposed to crime. Yet in looking at the 
specific genesis of the French Connection, it is essential to understand how a 
specific set of men utilized diasporic communities and associations to form the 
networks and methods utilized to transport heroin across the Atlantic Ocean.
 Two separate, but overlapping, systems of transatlantic trade helped forge the 
French Connection’s westward passage across the sea. The sex trade that linked 
France with the wider world provided the first inroads into the ports and markets 
that opiates would later follow. By the end of the nineteenth century, industrious 
French seamen, pimps and prostitutes had established bordellos across the Medi-
terranean and Atlantic. Although by no means a singularly organized industry, 
‘the white slave trade’ helped form a number of small expatriate communities in 
cities ranging from Saigon to Rio de Janeiro. The potential personal and finan-
cial rewards one could glean as a ‘procurer’ established an important precedent 
for petty criminals and aspiring sailors from Marseille and other French ports. It 
was possible, and likely, that one could realize their fortunes committing crimes 
abroad.37
 French sex workers had been plying their trade in Cairo, Beirut and Buenos 
Aires decades in advance of any international anti- opiate agreement. Neither 
France, nor Marseille in particular, held any advantage within the early heroin 
smuggling market in the aftermath of The Hague Opium Convention of 1912. 
According to reports filed to the League of Nations, illicit opiate laboratories 
opened and closed in Paris, Basel, Sofia, Istanbul and many other locations 
through the interwar era. Perhaps with the exception of the notorious Eliopolous 
Brothers, most smuggling rings that transported heroin across the Atlantic did so 
36 American officials and journalists repeatedly observed that Corsican and Italian criminals treated 
one another as kinsmen. Whether ‘these two people call themselves cousins’, as agent Martin 
Pera asserted in testimony before the US Senate, is only partially relevant. It is perhaps more 
symbolic of what scholars have more recently come to call the ‘ethnicity trap’ of thinking about 
organized crime. See J. Albanese, Transnational Crime and the 21st Century, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011; US Senate, Organized Crime, p. 873.
37 Pierrat, Une Histoire.
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on a short- term or an ad- hoc basis. Historical evidence from this era places par-
ticular emphasis upon the emergence of New York- based criminal syndicates as 
an important force in driving heroin imports into the United States.38
 According to available studies and records, aspects of the French sex trade 
began to overlap with illicit heroin trafficking during the latter stages of the 
interwar period. The two figures credited with the melding of these two indus-
tries were men critically associated with the birth of the modern Marseille under-
world: Paul Carbone and François Spirito. By the late 1920s, both men had 
accrued lengthy criminal records both in France and abroad. Carbone first made 
his name as a drug dealer and pimp (a crime for which he would be expelled 
from Egypt in 1924). Spirito similarly got his start in the sex industry as an 
entertainer and consort of a neighbourhood madam. Upon becoming friends the 
two utilized their connections spanning ports along the Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean to gradually establish a global chain of brothels in cities in France, 
Argentina, Egypt, Spain and Tunisia.39 Their parallel interests in gambling and 
commodities smuggling eventually led the men to enter the heroin trade. Refin-
ing heroin, as opposed to the smuggling of it, proved to be the Carbone–Spirito 
syndicate’s greatest innovation. According to lore, Carbone convinced a one- 
time merchant seaman- turned-smuggler, Dominique Albertini, to learn the craft. 
After learning the proper science of heroin manufacturing from an unemployed 
debauched chemist named Charles Fortin, Albertini established his own labora-
tories in Marseille and other portions of the Cote d’Azur. Albertini’s refineries 
eventually honed their production capacity to produce heroin of near absolute 
purity.40
 Carbone and Spirito did not hold absolute influence over Marseille. Their 
ability to exercise control over various rackets in the city during the 1920s and 
early 1930s was deeply indebted to their friendship with Simon Sabiani, Mar-
seille’s powerful deputy mayor. The rise of a rival clan of racketeers under the 
leadership of Antoine Guerini in the late 1920s placed further pressure upon 
Carbone and Spirito to yield portions of their monopoly over prostitution and 
gambling in the city.41 The Second World War struck the greatest blow against 
the Carbone–Spirito network. With the onset of the Nazi occupation, the two 
men followed in the footsteps of their political patron, Simon Sabiani, in 
collaborating with the Vichy administration. The Allied victory, in turn, proved 
devastating to their criminal empire. Upon Carbone’s assassination at the 
hands of the French resistance, Spirito escaped to Spain and exile. In exchange 
for their support for de Gaulle and the Allies, Guerini and his brothers seized 
upon the postwar moment and assumed preeminent positions with the Marseille 
38 Anslinger and Oursler, The Murderers; Meyer and Parssinen, Web.
39 S. Kitson, Police and Politics in Marseille, 1936–1945, Leiden: Brill, 2014; Pierrat, Une 
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40 P. Galante and L. Sapin, The Marseilles Mafia: The Truth Behind the World of Drug Trafficking, 
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underworld (a status bolstered by their support of Paris’s postwar campaign 
against communist sympathizers).
 France’s liberation from the Axis occupation touched off the most critical 
stage leading to the organization of the French Connection. The collapse of the 
Vichy regime prompted an exodus of other criminals following Spirito’s flight 
abroad. By 1950, several well- established Marseille gangsters (who had also 
aided the Vichy regime) – Joseph Orsini, Auguste Ricord and Antoine 
D’Agostino – had established new contacts and criminal enterprises in the Amer-
icas. Orsini, Spirito and D’Agostino each came to ingratiate themselves in the 
company and dealings of prominent criminal networks in Montreal and New 
York.42 Ricord, by contrast, found a new home among French transplants and 
native pimps, prostitutes and drug dealers in Argentina. Orisini’s brothers, Pierre 
and Dominique, provided essential assistance in aiding the establishment and 
growth of Ricord’s nascent drug empire.43 What allowed these men entrée into 
these new criminal circles, as well as the degree to which these men coordinated 
with one another, is not entirely clear. An even greater mystery is what was the 
spark that led them to begin a concerted effort to import heroin into the Ameri-
cas. Regardless of the means or motivations, each of these individuals became 
critical intermediaries between Marseille’s restored underworld and entrenched 
criminal networks in North and South America.
 All available accounts, which include FBN reports and journalistic investiga-
tions, depict the postwar relationships forged between traffickers in Europe and 
the Americas as highly fluid and lacking a clear hierarchy. No individual, family 
or gang based in France monopolized the westward bound trade in drugs. Routes 
utilized by the Spirito–D’Agostino–Orsini network appeared to have alternated 
depending upon the temporal conditions. Mexico City and pre- revolutionary 
Havana, for example, constituted early transshipment points to the United States. 
Yet with the ascendency of Fidel Castro, the Marseille men most associated with 
Havana’s role in transatlantic heroin smuggling, Paul Mondolini, Jean- Baptiste 
Croce and Ansan Bistoni, easily transitioned their operations to continue through 
Spain, Montreal and New York.44 Crackdowns staged in Argentina had only a 
modest effect upon the smuggling interests of Auguste Ricord and his associates. 
While it is not clear exactly when Ricord’s ring entered the heroin trade, sub-
sequent revelations suggest that the Guerini brothers and Joseph Orsini helped 
underwrite smuggling operations in Buenos Aires.45 With the gradual retirement, 
or displacement, of Orsini and Spirito from trafficking, two sets of brothers from 
the Marseille underworld, the Venturi and Francisi brothers, assumed stronger 
ties with the North American activities of Paul Mondolini, Jean- Baptiste Croce 
and Ansan Bistoni.46
42 Charbonneau, The Canadian.
43 O. Aguirre, La Conexion Latina, Buenos Aires: Tusquets Editores, 2008.
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 These shifts and divergences within the organization of the postwar heroin 
trade by no means help to explain the mechanics of the French Connection in its 
entirety. There is no source in existence that elucidate the patterns, regularity or 
amounts of heroin that flowed out of France via the networks established after 
the Second World War. Internally issued FBN surveys offer mixed impressions 
as to the alliances and conflicts that existed within the ranks of major French 
trafficking rings. Individuals such as Mondolini, Croce and Orsini, it is sup-
posed, increasingly came into competition with one another despite earlier acts 
of cooperation.47 Regularly lost in any account of the French Connection is the 
degree to which drug trafficking accounted for the profits or business interests of 
gangsters based in France and elsewhere. It is highly likely, for example, that the 
eventual war fought between the Francisis and the Guerinis stemmed as much 
from clashes over domestic criminal interests (such as prostitution and gamb-
ling) than it did over transatlantic heroin smuggling. Personal and commercial 
links forged between prominent French and Levantine traffickers, such as the 
relationships between Sami al- Khoury and Marcel Francisi, also do not conclu-
sively demonstrate a coherent process by which morphine or heroin was smug-
gled into or through France.48 How heroin was smuggled into the United States 
appeared to have gone through various iterations and means over the course of 
the 1950s. Merchant seamen, diplomatic staff, airline personnel and other private 
citizens presented themselves as mules for conspirators based in France.49
 For all that obscures the inner workings of the French Connection’s middle 
passage across the ocean, archival and journalistic records imply that two con-
sistent forces anchored the various individuals and syndicates on either side of 
the Atlantic. Officials and journalists universally agree that Marseille’s chemists 
constituted the central force that sustained the French Connection’s existence. 
Law enforcement agents inside and outside of France repeatedly emphasized the 
roles of Dominique Albertini and Joseph Cesari in training a generation of 
skilled chemists capable of consistently distilling heroin with extremely high 
levels of potency. However, it is also possible that other chemists, such as 
Marius Ansaldi of Paris and Edouard Toudayan and Philippe Pasqualini of Mar-
seilles, established parallel or rival laboratories during the height of the French 
Connection.50
 North America’s highly organized and well- coordinated trafficking syndicates 
comprised a second important element that harnessed and sustained postwar 
Atlantic heroin trafficking. Much has been written about the consolidation of 
the so- called ‘Five Families’ of New York and the advent of a national commis-
sion governing organized crime groups in the United States after 1931. While 
47 Progress Report for the Month of January 1966, 4 February 1966; District 17 Files; FBN Files, 
1916–70; DEA Records; RG 170; NAB.
48 Charbonneau, The Canadian.
49 Progress Report for the Month of January 1963, 14 February 1963; District 17 Files; FBN Files, 
1916–70; DEA Records; RG 170; NAB; Progress Report for the Month of February 1965, 3 
March 1965; District 17 Files; FBN Files, 1916–70; DEA Records; RG 170; NAB.
50 Bazal, Le Clan.
66  R. Gingeras
scholars continue to debate the depths to which a national commission governed 
the activities of syndicates throughout North America,51 the organizational 
stability of groups in New York, Montreal and elsewhere arguably endowed the 
French Connection with a durable infrastructure within the North American 
market. As in the south of France, strong alliances forged between prominent 
mobsters and politicians helped secure the influence of organized crime in both 
cities. Boss Frank Costello’s grip over New York’s Democratic Party during and 
after the Second World War stands as the most vivid example of the pervasive-
ness with which mafia figures and associates influenced politics, economics and 
judicial affairs during the prime years of the French Connection.52 Unlike the 
Marseille networks, suspected narcotics distribution groups led by Bonnano, 
Lucchese (both from New York’s Five Families) and the Cotroni brothers (Mon-
treal) maintained relatively strong leadership and stability through the highs and 
lows of the French Connection.53
 The exact means, and challenges, that defined how North American groups 
distributed heroin locally and nationally is not entirely clear. Cases made in both 
the United States and Canada, such as the one that nabbed Fuca and Angelvin in 
1962, seem to suggest that distribution rings were syncretic and defused. A 
general survey in 1965 by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics almost uniformly 
associated regional distribution in places like Washington, Philadelphia and 
Cleveland with ‘negro violators’ with personal connections to New York 
traffickers.54
 FBN agents interpreted the involvement of noted Italian- American gangsters 
in heroin trafficking as confirmation that the conspiracy also included groups 
based in Italy as well. Such suspicions, to some extent, predated the bureau’s 
burgeoning interest in the conduct of French smugglers. Early suspicions that an 
Italian source was at the heart of the transatlantic heroin trade were linked to the 
FBN’s intense campaign to undermine and capture the once powerful New York 
boss Lucky Luciano. Agents remained intent upon proving Luciano’s role in the 
postwar trade even though the supposed source for his drug dealing (diverted 
heroin from legitimate Italian companies) bore no connection to networks based 
in France.55 Neither contemporary reports nor present- day scholarship give a 
complete picture of the degree to which Italian ‘mafia’ groups worked coopera-
tively with Marseille’s milieu. Journalists assigned by Newsday at one point sug-
gested that Joseph Renucci, one of Antoine Guerini’s early competitors and a 
predecessor of Marcel Francisi, served as the initial link for Luciano and other 
51 See Smith, The Mafia.
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Italian mafia groups seeking to export heroin to the United States.56 While it is 
possible that some Mafiosi based in Sicily, as well as the Italian mainland, may 
have acted as go- betweens between French and North American traffickers, 
other evidence, particularly investigations in the mid- 1960s, suggest that Italian 
groups came to establish direct connections between Levantine manufacturers 
and North American buyers. The FBN often pointed to the early case of Rosaria 
Mancino, a Sicilian crime figure who smuggled heroin through Marseille without 
any connection to the city’s major underworld groups.57
 Like in Turkey and Lebanon, American agents often soured towards their 
counterparts in France. Well into the 1960s, FBN agents expressed frustration 
towards the dysfunction and disinterest demonstrated by officers assigned by the 
Sûreté Nationale.58 Suspicions also derived from the supposed influence Corsi-
can traffickers exercised among their ethnic kin within law enforcement and 
political circles. This concern appeared increasingly validated (albeit privately) 
with revelations that Robert Blemant, a well- known member of France’s clan-
destine service, had invested himself mightily into France’s underworld.59 Amer-
ican law enforcement agencies responsible for the French Connection were, 
however, far from immune from corruption and internal subversion. The NYPD 
garnered a toxic reputation for corruption by the early 1970s (especially after 
local narcotics officers were charged with stealing and selling drugs seized in the 
original French Connection case from 1962). Richard Nixon eventually oversaw 
the closure and transfer of the FBN’s authority to the Department of Justice, in 
part as a result of charges of corruption on the part of the bureau’s agents.60 Both 
then and now, depicting the drug trade as an exclusively foreign threat provided 
a convenient means of diverting attention away from acts of complicity and 
incompetence among government agents and representatives.
Cracking the case: the investigation and breakdown of the 
French Connection
American investigators began to piece together the essential framework of the 
French Connection soon after the Second World War. A clandestine tour con-
ducted by the famed FBN agent George White in the summer of 1948 led to the 
first revelations regarding the opiate trafficking that connected the cities of Istan-
bul and Marseille. While it is not clear what precisely served to motivate the trip, 
the information and publicity he gleaned in 1948 inspired the bureau’s chief, 
56 Newsday, The Heroin.
57 D. Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996.
58 Henry Giordano to David Acheson, 14 October 1966; France Files, 1966–67; FBN Files, 
1916–70; DEA Records; RG 170; NAB.
59 D. Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf, London: Verso, 2004. While one FBN agent interviewed 
by Valentine suggested that the bureau had considered initiating an investigation against 
Blemant, available case files do not mention him by name.
60 Ibid.
68  R. Gingeras
Harry Anslinger, to press for a sustained counter- narcotics campaign in Europe. 
By 1950 a select number of agents were already actively surveilling potential 
suspects in Istanbul, Beirut and Marseille and attempting to elicit the support of 
local law enforcement.61 These efforts ran parallel to the FBN’s drive to raise 
domestic awareness of organized crime activity in the United States (an effort 
crowned by the bureau’s participation in the Kefauver hearings). An important 
element of both of these endeavours was the FBN’s campaign to monitor and 
entrap Lucky Luciano, who Anslinger personally believed to be a key player in 
international heroin trafficking. While the FBN failed to gather enough evidence 
to indict Luciano, investigations by agents in France, Turkey, Italy and Lebanon 
did produce a more coherent picture of opiate smuggling and processing activ-
ities in the Mediterranean basin. In 1954, Charles Siragusa, the FBN’s chief rep-
resentative in Europe, pencilled the first diagram charting out the multiple 
shipping routes emanating from the Levant and through France (see illustration 
below). Washington’s increased sensitivity to the extent of smuggling activities 
in the Mediterranean eventually led to the establishment of fixed FBN offices in 
Rome (1950), Beirut (1954), Istanbul (1960) and Marseille (1961).
 High profile arrests in North America amplified the FBN’s calls for more 
active law enforcement steps abroad. Antoine D’Agostino’s apprehension by 
Canadian police in 1949, followed by the arrest of Joseph Orsini and François 
Spirito in the United States in 1951, proved to be monumental in shaping the 
61 Gingeras, Heroin; Pembleton, Toiling.
Image 4.2 Heroin trafficking routes, 1954.
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FBN’s rendering of the French Connection. While prosecutors initially described 
Orsini’s ring as a relatively modest outfit (one that imported Yugoslav- derived 
opium from both France and Italy), officials and commentators eventually came 
to see the case as a definitive exposition of a coherent, powerful (alien) conspir-
acy operating on both sides of the Atlantic.62 A second case opened against 
Antoine D’Agostino in 1955 for heroin trafficking via Mexico provided the FBN 
with further indications of the pivotal influence French smugglers had over the 
American marketplace.63 Both the NYPD and the Canadian Royal Mounted 
Police contributed to the FBN’s formulation of the French Connection with the 
arrest of individuals such as Tommy Lucchese (1945), Vito Genovese (1958) 
and Guisippe Controni (1959).64 The FBN’s ability to affect prosecutions against 
major traffickers outside the Western Hemisphere was far less successful. Amer-
ican agents played a limited role in the apprehension of only a few noted traf-
fickers, such as Antoine Hakkouk in Lebanon (1959) and Hüseyin Eminoğlu in 
Turkey (1964).65 European law enforcement agencies and courts contributed 
more considerably in the cases levied against such traffickers as Jean- Baptiste 
Croce and Sami al- Khoury (1959).66
 The initial threat of prosecution and imprisonment did not deter major traf-
fickers from maintaining or resuming their interests in the heroin trade. While 
D’Agostino and Orsini were incarcerated in the US, neither faced serious pro-
secution or jail time for their participation in drug smuggling or the Nazi occu-
pation back in France. French police apprehended Paul Mondolini in 1949, 1955 
and 1967 for crimes related to forgery, theft and trafficking and yet still remained 
at the centre of the investigation into the French Connection. Sami al- Khoury 
and İhsan Sekban proved even more elusive investigative targets. Both men, as 
well as Jean Jehan (the Spirito/Orsini- linked trafficker who had employed both 
Fuca and Angelvin in the original 1962 French Connection case) vanished from 
American and domestic surveillance to the point that their final whereabouts to 
this day remains unknown. Whether as a result of inertia on the part of local law 
enforcement, or the lack of admissible evidence, FBN agents often opted to 
focus upon petty smugglers or producers in lieu of bringing major traffickers to 
justice. American officers based in Turkey were especially active in assisting 
gendarmes and national police officials in prosecuting opium growers and 
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merchants (a strategy born of the bureau’s struggles in investigating major 
wholesalers based in Istanbul and Antep).67
 Dynamics other than police pressure brought on serious challenges for French 
Connection traffickers. FBN agents based in Europe began to track greater 
amounts of heroin trafficking through West Germany as early as 1965, a trend 
that pointed to a decline in smuggling via Syria and Lebanon.68 While the origins 
of this pattern remain somewhat obscure, law enforcement officials associated 
this change with the rising influence of Turkish manufacturers and traffickers in 
the European and American markets.69 Lebanon’s significance as a centre for 
heroin production and transshipment was dealt an even more devastating blow 
as a result of the Six Day War. The closure of the border between Lebanon and 
Syria created a shortage of available morphine stocks in France and further 
impetus for traffickers to establish heroin- processing facilities in more secure 
locations. As the 1960s came to an end, heroin laboratories sprang up in greater 
numbers in Turkey and Italy, a shift that prompted noted Turkish wholesalers 
such as Sefer Bezal to reach out directly to individuals connected to the Italian 
underworld.70
 The growing assertiveness and independence of Turkey’s most prominent 
heroin traffickers came at a time of increased instability within the Marseille 
milieu. Long simmering tensions within the city violently came to the surface 
with the assassination of Antoine Guerini. Guerini’s assassination came at a time 
in which many of the founders of the postwar transatlantic heroin trade suc-
cumbed to either imprisonment or death. The peaceful passing of Dominique 
Albertini (1970), François Spirito (1967) and Joseph Orsini (1972), as well as 
the arrest of Bartholmy Guerini and Paul Mondolini, provided opportunities for 
younger, more subordinate leaders within Marseille’s underworld (particularly 
the Francisi and Ventura brothers).71 Heroin trafficking continued apace through 
France in the midst of this change in regime. However, the rise of violence and 
competition between the Marseille factions (especially in response to more 
domestic criminal industries such as prostitution and gambling) gradually weak-
ened the hold French outfits exerted over the transatlantic smuggling trade.
 Richard Nixon’s victory in the 1968 election arguably marked a definitive 
tipping point in the struggle to bring the French Connection to an end. Nixon’s 
administration wasted little time in making the heroin trade a domestic and 
foreign policy priority. In addition to ramping up the legal powers and spending 
limits of federal law enforcement agencies (especially the newly created Bureau 
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of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs or BNDD), Nixon made direct overtures to 
the governments of Mexico, France and Turkey to assume a firmer stance on 
matters related to drug trafficking.72 By the time of his resignation in 1974, this 
American diplomatic offensive seemed to have borne out a string of demonstra-
ble successes. A series of high- level exchanges between Nixon and President 
François Pompidou led to a dramatic crackdown against traffickers and chemists 
based in the environs of Marseille. Press agencies in both Europe and North 
America greeted the apprehension of chemist Joseph Cesari in 1972 as an espe-
cially decisive and encouraging turn in the Franco- American struggle against 
heroin.73 Perhaps the most audacious achievement claimed by the Nixon admin-
istration came as a result of Ankara’s 1971 pledge to ban opium production 
throughout Turkey. The millions of dollars in economic aid Washington prom-
ised in exchange for the eradication of Turkey’s opium crop was deemed a small 
price to pay in Nixon’s estimation. After decades of negotiation between Turkey 
and United States on the issue of opium production, the accord, in his words, 
was ‘by far the most significant breakthrough that has been achieved in stopping 
the source of heroin in our worldwide offensive against dangerous drugs’.74
 Though many contemporary observers were convinced that the French Con-
nection met its match by the time Nixon left office, dissenting voices in the press 
raised serious doubts about the results of France’s assault on Marseille’s milieu. 
Newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic ran critical exposés questioning the 
effect and extent of police raids against laboratories and warehouses along the 
Cote d’Azur. Newspapers quoted unnamed official sources claiming that 
powerful bureaucrats and politicians continued to protect major traffickers in 
France from prosecution. Such claims were partially justified with the 1972 trial 
of Leon Delouette, an employ of the French intelligence service caught trying to 
smuggle 110 pounds of heroin into the United States.75 By the time Ankara 
reversed its decision regarding opium gum harvesting in 1974, the victory the 
Nixon administration had claimed over the global heroin trade appeared undeni-
ably premature. After a brief drought in the early 1970s, heroin from Mexican 
and Asian sources readily replaced stocks from Turkey in the illicit American 
marketplace.76 More ominously, government statisticians documented increased 
rates in Europe after 1974 as well.
 The continued vibrancy of the transatlantic heroin market did not necessarily 
mean, however, that the original French Connection endured. Internecine violence 
among gangsters in Marseille and Paris, as well as continued court inquiries, 
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eventually claimed the lives and livelihoods of the original members of the ori-
ginal French Connection network. While Jean Baptiste Croce was sentenced to 
eighteen years in 1974, other former luminaries, such as Paul Mondoloni and 
Anson Bistoni, were assassinated in the early 1980s. The Mondolini and Bistoni 
murders, as well as the killing of Marcel Francisi, typified the bitter climate of the 
Marseille underworld, an era defined by the brutal machinations of the era’s most 
notorious gangster, Anthony ‘Tany’ Zampa (a former Guerini ally).77
 As Marseille’s old milieu tore itself apart, heroin producers and smugglers 
outside of France steadily adapted to the conditions brought on by Richard 
Nixon’s War on Drugs. Traffickers of heroin produced in Asia were among the 
first to respond to the drug shortages wrought by Turkey’s opium ban.78 While it 
is unclear to what degree Asian heroin helped to compensate for the initial 
droughts seen in New York and elsewhere, subsequent American investigations, 
as well as insider accounts, suggest that Turkish traffickers had long prepared to 
replace many of the roles previously played by French chemists and smugglers. 
Relying heavily upon new opium stocks imported from Iran, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, a new generation of Turkish chemists transformed eastern Anatolia 
into a centre for processing opium into heroin. By the late 1970s, homegrown 
and expatriate Turkish syndicates, including some with ties to Kurdish militants, 
had forged stronger ties with organized crime groups in Italy and begun to export 
directly to North America via Bulgaria, the Netherlands and West Germany.79
 American officials greeted the 1979 arrest of two Turkish nationals for heroin 
trafficking in New York as indicative of several new, daunting challenges facing 
law enforcement on both sides of the ocean. Unlike the Turkish poppy fields 
associated with the French Connection, Americans saw ‘no prospect for control 
at [opium and heroin] production sites’ in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Thai-
land. Infiltrating and arresting traffickers required a new set of partnerships and 
approaches among American and European law enforcement.80 The task, the 
Justice Department admitted, was fraught by the lack of manpower and disagree-
ments on tactics. ‘Europe’, one official quipped, was attempting ‘to cope with 
[this] 20th century problem by using 18th century laws’ governing surveillance 
and undercover investigations. Worse still, the number of heroin users on both 
sides of the Atlantic had grown significantly larger since the start of the 1970s. 
The growing demand for heroin in Germany (whose addict population swelled 
as high as 80,000 in 1979) and elsewhere underscored the failure of past counter-
 narcotic campaigns in combating demand.81 As both American and European 
officials struggled to meet these new tests, the French Connection’s demise 
increasingly became a trivial matter of history.
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Towards a conclusion: the limits and realities of hindsight
A number of opportunities and challenges await anyone attempting to more thor-
oughly document and analyse the French Connection. The national archives of 
Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy and Germany undoubtedly possess files and 
reports that can shed greater light on the case. Depending upon the availability 
of documents in the possession of the DEA and CIA, still more revelations await 
scholars in Washington, DC. Those capable of following in the footsteps of 
Douglas Valentine may uncover ever greater untapped resources among former 
prosecutors and investigators. Personal papers and interviews with veteran offi-
cers and officials from outside of the United States are greatly needed if we are 
to add greater texture and complexity to this story.
 Yet as seen from the sources available to us, a historical treatment of the 
French Connection underscores how finite our understanding of the case 
remains. As of now, officials and journalists continue to unduly dominate our 
comprehension of the postwar heroin trade. The importance of finding new 
accounts of the French Connection, particularly among smugglers, chemists and 
non- American observers, is critical if we are to have a better grasp of the French 
Connection’s internal mechanics. Attaining new documentary and oral sources 
on the postwar heroin trade will also offset the degree to which the case has been 
politicized and distorted. The narrative outlined in this piece leaves little doubt 
that the French Connection was, in large measure, an expression of American 
apprehensions and interests. FBN agents assigned to the case struggled mightily 
to depict the heroin trafficking as a singular conspiracy targeting the United 
States. This need to embellish the French Connection with coherency and 
purpose was partially a reflection of contemporary thinking about organized 
crime and narcotics. Experiences in the United States, as well as the significance 
with which law enforcement agents viewed ethnicity and immigrants, led Ameri-
can observers to see heroin trafficking as a deliberate foreign plot hatched by a 
string of French, Italian, Turkish and Lebanese masterminds. One must also take 
into account the institutional prerogatives of the FBN in considering how agents 
presented the French Connection. In an era that featured heightened anxieties 
about foreign subversion and the rapid growth the American ‘national security 
state’, the FBN’s leadership was obliged to frame the bureau’s undertakings as 
akin to the fight against Communism and the Soviets. Heroin, like Marxism, 
threatened to poison the minds and spirits of the nation’s youth. In orchestrating 
its spread, gangsters possessed the same determination and singular train of 
thought as the leaders of the Second World. When looking at the politics and 
bureaucratic priorities of the present- day DEA, it would appear that some aspects 
of this Cold War approach towards narcotics and crime endure.
 A closer inspection of the FBN case files, as well as journalist accounts, 
reveal other continuities of behaviour among contemporary law enforcement and 
traffickers. American and European agents have sustained many of the strategies 
and tactics employed by Anslinger’s FBN. Administrators in Washington and 
elsewhere still undertake campaigns and measure success against organized 
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crime on the premise of apprehending noted ‘kingpins’. Paid informants persist 
as a primary means of extracting information; officers still rely heavily upon 
controlled buys to draw out suspects. Conversely, evidence drawn from the 
French Connection case underscores the degree to which the balloon effect 
defines trends in drug production and smuggling. The fluidity of the postwar 
heroin trade was the product of a variety of sources; police crackdowns, political 
instability, shifts in demand and entrepreneurial initiative each affected how 
heroin was traded across the Atlantic. Lastly, internal FBN correspondence, as 
well as public scandals, stress the extent to which law enforcement officers and 
officials of various stripes collaborated or abetted the dealings of individuals 
involved in drug trafficking. While often a subject that contributed to tensions 
between American and European officials, the growth and evolution of the 
French Connection case emphasize the extent to which the rise and fall of drug 
trafficking networks depend upon alliances forged between the ‘establishment’ 
and the ‘underworld’.
